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This paper develops a new systematic classification and explanation of barriers and drivers 
to energy efficiency. Using an ‘actor oriented approach’, the paper tries to identify (i) the 
drivers and barriers that affect the success or failure of energy efficiency investments and (ii) 
the institutions that are responsible for the emergence of these barriers and drivers. This 
taxonomy aims to synthesise ideas from three broad perspectives, viz., micro (project/end 
user), meso (organization), and macro (state, market, civil society). The paper develops a 
systematic framework by looking at the issues from the perspective of different actors. This 
not only aids the understanding of barriers and drivers; it also provides scope for 
appropriate policy interventions. This focus will help policy-makers evaluate to what extent 
future interventions may be warranted and how one can judge the success of particular 
interventions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Energy development is a barometer of economic development. Countries pursuing economic 
growth are expected to resort to increasing levels of energy use. Achieving these levels of 
energy production and utilisation through present technologies is not only difficult and 
expensive, but also environmentally unsustainable. Various studies indicate that increased 
energy efficiency can bridge the gap between growing demand and reduced energy supply 
without adversely affecting the quality of service [1-2].  However, as the past experience has 
shown, this may not happen, unless the issues that hinder the penetration of efficient 
technologies are addressed [3-5]. There is a gap between the theoretical opportunities for 
cost-effective
2
 energy efficiency investments and the levels that can be achieved practically. 
The origins of the gap seem to lie in the set of barriers which may be divided into categories 
such as financial, legal, organizational, or informational. These barriers prevent investments 
in energy efficient technologies. It is also certain that there are drivers that help increase 
investments. The barriers hinder the penetration of energy efficient technologies, even though 
these technologies have been shown to be economically cost-effective. If policies to 
encourage investments in improved energy efficiency are to be successful, understanding the 
nature of these barriers and drivers is essential. These policies must succeed in the context of 
liberalising energy markets, falling energy prices, and increasing the development of a broad-
based energy service industry.  
                                                 
2 Economic cost-effectiveness depends on both: where the actor-concern boundary is placed (the individual or the 
society as whole), the time perspective (static or long term dynamics included) and the system regarded (ceteris 




3The aim of the present paper is thus to examine the nature of barriers and drivers for energy 
efficiency. It also analyses the circumstances in which they arise, their relative importance in 
different contexts, and the manner in which different actors intervene to overcome these 
barriers.  The paper reviews current perspectives on barriers and drivers, classifies them 
according to their influencing patterns, and provides supporting evidence for their prevalence. 
Finally, the paper tries to evaluate the effectiveness of different institutions for improving energy 
efficiency. The debate on barriers and drivers is contentious and is characterised by disagreement 
over basic theoretical and conceptual principles. Hence, the primary objective of this work is to 
develop a new systematic theoretical framework. 
2. ENERGY EFFICIENCY - ISSUES 
2.1 Debate 
 
There has been a long running debate over the issue of energy efficiency (EE) between 
energy economists and energy analysts. One issue concerns the rebound effect [6]. Although 
definitions vary, this effect describes the following linkage: the efficient use of energy leads 
to an increase in the use of energy. This may partly offset the savings in energy usage 
achieved by the EE improvement. The rebound effect is rooted in neoclassical economic 
theory. The extent of the rebound effect depends on the price elasticity of demand. Therefore, 
the assumption of rational decision making is the precondition for an explanation of this 
effect.  
Saunders [7], argues that ‘energy efficiency gains can increase energy consumption by two 
means: by making energy appear effectively cheaper than other inputs; and by increasing 
economic growth, which pulls up energy use.’ The debate grew more intense in the 1990s, 
spurred by global warming concerns. The argument for EE, however, is independent of 
environmental concerns. The market failure that distorts energy use is under pricing of energy 
 
 
4by regulators and deregulation is preferable to EE into which utilities were forced to reduce 
energy prices. There are also other market failures, such as split incentives (landlord-tenant), 
etc [8]. The reality is that while EE is technologically feasible, it will require a significant 
change in collective approach to making it work. What this means is that, while technologies 
are already available, the problem lies in their application. Another aspect to which 
contributions to the EE debate can be associated is what one describes as a matter of 
‘governmental intervention’. Gunn [9] who investigated the paradigms of EE stated that it is 
important to recognize that the primary debate is over the optimal level of governmental 
intervention in energy markets rather than over the optimal level of EE. There are many 
forms of government intervention such as subsidies and taxes; special purpose loans; 
facilitation (information systems; well-structured markets; approved suppliers); guarantees 
for specific risks, or offering insurance; and arranging objective non-partisan product 
information (e.g., energy labeling) 
The justification and degree of governmental intervention is a matter of debate in the 
international literature [3, 4, 10]. Barriers which are attributed to market failures make 
governmental intervention necessary and justifiable and a large body of international 
literature relates barriers to market failures. However, others claim that only few market 
failures can be defined as such. Haugland, et al [11]  argue that most barriers merely reflect 
‘unaccounted (transaction)’ costs or simply result from the consumer’s liberty to choose 
freely his/her convenience and service levels and willingness to accept a higher energy bill 
for their personal taste or lifestyle. Therefore, governmental intervention might be 
questionable. 
A large body of international literature puts effort in an empirical approach to this question 
with different objects of investigations and findings  [12-14].  Governmental stimulation of 
the implementation of new technology by promoting associated research and development 
 
 
5was found to be counterproductive. Although it leads to technological progress it may hinder 
corporate investments in new technology. Firms may favour to wait for the next generation of 
technological developments. In the case of a restructuring electricity market pro-
interventionists ask whether the market alone is able to overcome EE barriers. It is argued 
that governmental support in promoting EE and load management can be advantageous. 
Further, an evaluation of US energy labelling programs led [14] concluded that, ‘government 
support is the most critical factor for the success of a labelling program.’ Altogether, the 
challenge of reconciling government and free market contributions with regard to the energy 
market and EE remains. 
2.2 Characterization of Energy Efficiency potential,  
With regard to EE potential, a distinction has to be made between: (i) the economic potential: 
achievable by removing market failures; ii) the technological potential: achievable by the 
additional removal of ‘non-market barriers
3
’; and (iii) the hypothetical potential: achievable 
through the additional elimination of market failures
4
 in fuel and electricity markets [15]. 
This framework is summarised in Figure 1 where various potentials towards EE are 
represented. The market potential is the efficiency improvement that can be expected to be 
realized for a projected year under a given set of conditions (e.g., energy prices, consumer 
preferences and energy policies). The market potential reflects barriers and market 
imperfections that keep efficiency potential from being fully realized. 
The economic potential is the energy saving that would result if during each year of the 
period in question, all replacements, retrofits and new investments were shifted to the most 
energy-efficient technologies that are still cost-effective at given energy market prices. The 
                                                 
3 Technical barrier is the one where the new technology might be found wanting or become rapidly outdated. 
4
Market failure is a distinct notion for such problems that can not be solved (in full) by use of market 
instruments, such as public goods, externalities, etc. Such failures cannot be eliminated though there are some 
“Pareto-sanctioned” measures that redeem them.  The market failure here means “market imperfections” where 




6economic potential implies a well-functioning market, with competition between investments 
in energy supply and demand. It also assumes that the barriers to such competition have been 
corrected by energy policies. It is assumed that as a result of such policies, all users have easy 
access to reliable information about the cost-effectiveness and technical performance of 
existing and emerging options for energy efficiency. 
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7The technical potential represents achievable energy savings under theoretical considerations 
of thermodynamics, where final energy consumption is kept constant, and energy losses can 
be minimized through process substitution, heat and material re-use, and avoiding heat loss. 
This can be considered as hypothetical potential and represents achievable energy savings 
that result from implementing the most energy-efficient technology available at a given time, 
regardless of cost considerations and reinvestment cycle. 
narrow social optimum in the market for energy efficient The   technologies represents the rate 
of energy efficiency uptake that would be observed if all barriers that were deemed to be 
irrational on a cost-effective basis were eliminated, i.e., if people adopted all measures that 
could leave them economically better off given the current pricing environment.  In this 
situation, one has to get energy prices right implying that narrow social optimum should 
include cost effective removal of market failures for energy. The true social optimum would 
include additional efficiency diffusion that would likely to be seen by considering 
environmental externalities.
2.3 Energy Efficiency - Private investor’s perspective  
Analysis of EE and the role of barriers have to be viewed from a private investor perspective. 
A barrier will only be overcome if it is low enough to be acceptable and the investor is 
convinced of this fact. This is especially important for the barrier formed by some risks, as 
risks are notoriously difficult to judge. In addition, the investor will often, out of self-
preservation, have to take account of the ‘worst-case’ risk, and that is a far bigger deterrent 
than the ‘probable-risk’. Thus, we can distinguish the barriers to private financing as 
profitability-related, feasibility-related, information-related, and risk-related. 
Profitability-related barriers are those that lessen the financial viability of energy efficiency 
projects, thereby reducing the willingness of profit-oriented private investors to commit 
money to such projects. Figure 2 shows the factors and their relationship that enable the 
 
 
8private investor to accept or reject an energy efficiency project. The representation is in terms 
of input-output model and the dependent factors.  
Figure.2 Representation of profitability barriers 
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9The components making up gross project revenue can include: (a) project performance (e.g., 
amount of energy saved), (b) sales volume (e.g., number of energy efficient devices sold), (c) 
price (e.g., price of energy efficient devices), (d) tariff (e.g., electricity tariff), and (e) 
collection rate (e.g., rate of loan collection on energy efficient equipment sales, rate of utility 
bill collection). The components of project cost include development and operating cost.  
Figure 3: Representation of feasibility barriers 
 
 
   Energy    
efficiency 
project 












  Information support  
  Regulation support 
  Technology 






 High  Availability




















Feasibility barriers (Figure 3) reduce the likelihood of a project being implemented. Unlike 
profitability barriers, feasibility barriers have no impact on the economics of the project. 
Rather, they reduce the potential for successful project implementation and therefore increase 
the uncertainty about the project, ie whether the project can be carried out or not. In some 
cases, feasibility barriers may be so strong that no amount of profitability can outweigh their 
negative impact on the investor’s decision. 
There are some barriers, which affect both profitability and feasibility. For example, lack of 
information can raise the cost of a project (and thereby lower the profitability) and at the 
same time put the feasibility of a project in doubt. Investors may be reluctant to commit funds 
if they cannot verify the data or if they suspect hidden legal obstacles, such as restrictions on 
foreign ownership, capital repatriation, and so on. 
If one wants to study barriers and drivers, the influence they have on the deployment of new 
energy technologies, and the way in which these barriers and drivers could be modified, one 
needs a taxonomy. This taxonomy can be linked to each barrier/driver to the exact institutions 
that create it and the institutions on which it has an influence. Then the taxonomy becomes 
operational. For example, if someone wants to study the field, in a particular country, for a 
particular technology, the present taxonomy can be used as a guide to determining what 
actors should be interviewed, what questions to be asked, and how to bring the replies 
together for analysis. This approach can be best described as an ‘actor’ approach. (Ferguson, 
2002).  In the present study we have defined a new taxonomy that regroups the barriers into 





3.  BARRIERS AND DRIVERS  
3.1 Terminology and Main Issues  
 
Since the paper deals with drivers and barriers to private investment in energy-efficient 
technologies, the first task is to define the terminology. 
A barrier is a pull factor that inhibits investment in energy-efficient technologies. For 
empirical research on barriers to be fruitful we need to understand the nature of the barriers. 
This requires clarifying assumptions about the nature of individual behaviour and the relative 
importance of social structures and the role of markets. We also observe that the consumer’s 
response towards not exploiting the cost-effective technologies is sluggish. We provide 
explanation for such observations. The identification of the relevant actor is also crucial. For 
this we have to examine the role of individuals and organizations such as equipment 
manufacturers and government agencies. The outcome of this process will provide the 
reasons for the consumer not investing in cost-effective investments. 
Drivers can be considered as the factors that promote private investment in energy efficiency, 
Barriers can be considered as the obstacles to private investment; and Risk can be defined as 
a special category of barrier with a probability distribution. To be more specific, it can be 
defined as an uncertainty connected to the future value of the variable, which could be 
political, legal, financial, and so on. In other words, every factor that facilitates the 
implementation (feasibility) of a project and/or increases the returns/reduces the risk 
(profitability) of an investment can be considered as a driver.  On the other hand, every factor 
that does the opposite is a barrier. In the following sections, the main characteristics of 
 
 
12barriers are discussed. The same arguments are valid with respect to drivers but in the 
opposite sense. 
5
Firstly, barriers reduce the likelihood of a positive decision by a private investor , that is, 
they contribute to a no-go decision. There are factors that merely reduce the likelihood of a 
positive decision, while others single-handedly cause a negative investment decision, which 
means that some barriers are more influential than others. There are two basic reasons for a 
no-go decision: insufficient profitability or insufficient feasibility, or a combination of the 
two. In practice, there are usually several barriers and drivers contributing to either 
profitability or feasibility issues. The final outcome depends on whether the barriers are 
overall stronger than the drivers in the investor’s mind in terms of driving the decision. This 
brings us to the second characteristic. 
Secondly, barriers can become obstacles only if the investor perceives them as such. If the 
investor is not aware of a particular factor, or simply determined to proceed to invest, the 
particular barrier does not influence his decision. This means that the barrier may be real, but 
it has no influence on the investment decision. In short, reality is only important as far as the 
investor recognizes it and considers it relevant. There can be perceived barriers that are not 
real (e.g., the fear of operating in a transition economy, when, in fact, that economy creates 
no untoward problems for the activity proposed), as well as perceived drivers that are not real 
(like the expectation of a subsidy that, in fact, will not be given). 
Thirdly, some variables can, at the same time act as driving forces and also as barriers. Also, 
some barriers can be considered as driving forces in some countries and barriers in others. 
                                                 
5 The term private investor is here broadly defined as all private profit-oriented sources of capital, including 
individuals, companies operating in sustainable energy markets, greenhouse gas producers, financial intermediaries, 
and financial markets. Moreover, it should be noted that we are interested not in barriers and drivers to some 
vaguely defined concept like ‘private participation’ but in barriers and drivers to actual additional financial 
transactions. All forms of private participation that do not involve a financial transfer with the objective to make a 
profit are not counted. For example, it is not sufficient to succeed in ‘communicating’ with private actors, to get 
private investors ‘interested’ in particular ventures, or to mobilize private sector actors to ‘become involved’ in 
public-private partnerships, for example, by attending meetings, making joint declarations, or engaging in 
consultations on policy. 
 
 
13Therefore a proper barrier-analysis always needs to be a detailed one. This is especially the 
case if the investor has experience from other countries. 
And finally, it is also important to distinguish between the barrier and the result of a barrier. 
This distinction is important because the resulting impacts of a barrier can help identify/adopt 
appropriate response measures. Depending on the type of barriers they could result in 
inadequate financial support, lack of policy support, promote inefficient use of energy, etc. In 
this paper, we focus mainly on one result: the decision of private actors to provide money or 
withhold money for energy efficiency. 
3.2  Taxonomies – A Review 
 
According to neo-classical economic theory one can classify the barriers in terms of market 
failure and can evaluate short-term policy options to address them.  However, this theory 
neither explains the underlying causes for market failures nor provides directions to increased 
energy efficiency. The literature contains a great variety of taxonomies, which range from 
simple lists to useful and logical categorisations of barriers. 
A.K. N. Reddy [3] in his path breaking study on the ‘Barriers to Improvements in Energy 
Efficiency’ has classified the barriers into: (i) consumer-related, (ii) equipment manufacturer-
related, (iii) utility-related, (iv) financial institution-related, and (v) government-related. 
Another useful scheme has been developed by Weber [16], which distinguishes between: (i) 
Institutional barriers: Barriers caused by political institutions, ie state government, local 
authorities, etc; (ii) Market barriers: Obstacles conditioned by the market; (iii) Organizational 
barriers: Barriers within organizations, especially within firms; and (iv) Behavioural barriers: 
Barriers within individuals. 
Sorrell [5] prepared a taxonomy by systematically classifying the barriers (based on a 
comprehensive review of the literature) into three broad categories: (i) neo-classical, (ii) 
behavioural, and (iii) organizational. In addition, the taxonomy attempts to distinguish 
 
 
14between barriers that justify policy intervention, those that justify organizational change, and 
those that do neither. 
According to an USAID report [18] the gap in energy efficiency and its use in the market can 
be explained through: (i) pay back gap, (ii) lack of information, (iii) limited access to capital, 
(iv) lack of institutional estimates, (v) market structure, (vi) aversion to downtime and 
innovation, (vii)standardised inventories, and (viii) purchase decision criterion. 
Vine et al [19] studied the market barriers in the residential sector and classified them into:(i) 
lack of information about energy use, (ii) lack of access to information about financing 
investments in general and energy efficiency technologies in particular, and (iii) low 
importance given to energy efficiency in decision-making. 
According to the Energy and Environmental Economics Programme, San Francisco, 
California [20], barriers to energy efficiency can be classified as follows: (i) Imperfect 
information; (ii) Consumer attitudes; (iii) Limited access to capital, and cost disincentives; 
(iv) Misplaced incentives; (v) Product life cycles; (vi) High consumer discount rates; (vii) 
Electricity rate distortions and regulatory uncertainty; and (viii) Externalities. 
In the paper on ‘Market barriers to energy efficiency: A critical reappraisal of the rationale 
for public policies to promote energy efficiency’, [21] studied the market barriers and 
concluded that there is a substantial ‘efficiency gap’ between a consumer’s actual 
investments in energy efficiency and those that appear to be in the consumer’s own interest. It 
was concluded that many of the market barriers can be understood as examples of market 
failures and do provide a prima facie basis for government intervention. 
Reddy BS [10] in his work for the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), has 
categorized the barriers into (i) financial-economic, (ii) technical, (iii) awareness and 
information, (iv) institutional-organizational, (v) regulatory, and (vi) personnel and 
behavioural barriers.   
 
 
15All these taxonomies are useful for developing measures for empirical studies. In this paper 
we unify the classifications by defining three broad categories, namely, micro, meso and 
macro. 
4.  MICRO-MESO-MACRO TAXONOMY (M3T) 
4.1 Barriers to energy efficiency  based on M3T 
 
In order to facilitate the barrier analysis effectively we now define a new taxonomy (named 
M3T) where the barriers are classified as micro, meso and macro. 
4.1.1 Micro  barriers 
Micro barriers are those that occur at the lowest level, for example at the design stage of a 
programme or a project. These can be referred to as the obstacles that  are unique to a 
particular project. A poorly designed project/programme can make insufficient use of 
synergies or drivers, or take too little account of barriers.  The person to address is the project 
designer (information, training, support by specialists, etc). Examples include: a medium size 
or large project, consisting of households from a group of villages or a town, is usually more 
profitable than dispersed and one-off small projects due to lower transaction costs and 
economies of scale. A project that consults the representatives of benefited target groups 
(e.g., consumers, equipment manufacturers, financial institutions) is usually more feasible 
than the one that is imposed from above. 
By changing the features of a project – for example, by modifying incentives for energy 
savings, replacing the technology, increasing the project size, or creating legitimacy through 
consultation – the financial viability and feasibility could be improved. Also, changes in 
project design can reduce the internal barriers to profitability and feasibility. 
4.1.2  Meso barriers 
Meso barriers occur at the intermediate level, i.e., in the implementation stage. These relate to 
the organizations affiliated with the project. These barriers can be common to a wide variety 
 
 
16of projects and can be tackled with efficient organizational design, human resource, as well as 
time management.  Examples include: (i) The implementing agency may be understaffed, 
bureaucratic, or lack proper incentives for promoting energy efficient lighting systems; (ii) 
The project target groups (e.g., rural households) may be small, inexperienced and under 
capitalised; (iii) The consumers may lack experience in a particular lighting technology (iv) 
The implementation authority may be unaware about the details of a geographic area where 
the project has to be implemented; and (v) The government authorities may put forth rules 
and procedures that can raise the cost of the project and/or reduce the feasibility of 
implementation. 
4.1.3  Macro barriers 
The macro barriers occur at the highest level: state, market, and civil society. Since these 
barriers are not project or organization-specific, they cannot be altered by changing project or 
organizational design. For project sponsors and financiers, macro barriers are externally 
driven and are difficult to influence (unless they have the power of influencing policies, 
market, or culture). In some cases, projects include policy components, which can affect 
macro variables (e.g., electricity tariffs, laws about who will keep financial savings from 
energy efficiency projects, subsidies, etc.). It is usually easier for project sponsors and 
investors to change the project characteristics than it is to influence government policies such 
as electricity tariffs and subsidies. Therefore, many projects do not even attempt to change 
macro variables and instead focus on overcoming or neutralizing the adverse effects of macro 
barriers through increased financial subsidies – or, more rarely, through innovative project 
and organizational design. The benefits of tackling macro barriers are usually much greater 
than focusing merely on micro and meso level barriers, and the sustainability of results over 
time is much greater as well.  
 
 
174.2  3D representation  
Targeting of barriers is illustrated in Figure 4 in three dimensional (3D) space. The three axes 
represent sustainability (X axis), difficulty (Y axis) and benefits (Z axis). Points on XY plane 
measure targeting macro barriers, YZ plane targeting meso barriers and ZX plane targeting 
micro barriers. The point P in the box (3D space) represented by a line from origin shows the 
composition of various types of barriers for a given target efficiency potential. The 
components  (micro, meso and micro) can be determined by projecting this line onto 
respective planes. Projection on X, Y and Z axis gives the role of individual factors 
(sustainability, difficulty, and benefits). This representation can be used to analyse various 
factors targeting the barriers. The representation can be used for synthesis also when 
externalities are given. According to the figure, if we target micro barriers (marked ‘XZ’ in 
the figure), we can expect relatively low benefits and sustainability of results, but these 
measures are also relatively easy to implement. But if we want to influence macro barriers 
(marked ‘XY’ in the figure), we can expect much greater difficulty, but also much higher 
benefits that are sustainable over time. Meso barriers lie somewhere in between on all 
dimensions (marked ‘YZ’ in the figure). 
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 Barriers relating to the state are those that can be traced to the behaviour (action or inaction) 
of governments or state-run organizations (e.g., public utilities). Barriers relating to the 
market are those that can be traced to the behaviour of individuals, private firms and financial 
institutions, which reflect the prevailing market structure. And finally, barriers relating to 
civil society can be traced to the behaviour of NGOs, academic institutions and other civil 
society organizations (CSOs). While the distinction between state, market and civil society 
barriers is useful as a means of classification, in practice, there are linkages between them. 
For example, markets react to policy changes and vice versa; policy is affected by the 
lobbying of firms; and NGOs and other civil society organizations operate within a political 
and economic context. Efforts to remove or reduce macro barriers need to pay attention to 
these relationships in order to be effective. 
The barriers can be further classified into internal (barriers due to flaws in the project or the 
organization) and external (policy, market, and civil society barriers). Internal barriers are 
easier to overcome, because they require only changes in the project or the organizations 
involved in the project whereas external barriers require policy changes, measures to affect 
the workings of markets, or measures to influence civil society or the culture of a country. In 
designing a complete model, there are numerous variables that could potentially be relevant: 
there are variables in the three categories of project, organization, and policy design, and 
there are variables in the causal pathway (the categories of drivers and barriers). 
In summary, an analytic taxonomy starts with the basic reasons for lack of private 
investment: the perception of lack of profitability and/or lack of feasibility (it does not matter 
what the real barriers and drivers are; their effect depends only on the perception of the 
investor). This leads to a distinction between factors that cause the lack of profitability and 
others that cause the lack of feasibility. These factors may occur at three levels, micro 
 
 
19(project), meso (organization), and macro (policy, market, civil society). At each of the three 
levels, there are measures that can address the profitability and feasibility issues.. 
5.  CAUSAL MODEL OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT DECISION 
If the objective is to maximize private investment in energy efficient technologies at a 
minimum cost to the consumer, we need to find out which factors (drivers and barriers) 
influence private investment decisions. But a list of factors is not sufficient. We need to know 
the relative contribution (causal weight) of these factors in terms of influencing investment 
decisions. Only then we are able to design and prioritize measures to mobilize private capital 
for clean technologies. There are two types of measures: (a) those that stimulate the drivers of 
private investment, and (b) those that reduce, remove, or overcome the barriers to private 
investment. The best measures are those that have the greatest positive effect on mobilizing 
private capital relative to their cost for the taxpayers. In other words, we need to find the 
cheapest way to stimulate the key drivers and to remove the key barriers.  For this, it is 
necessary to develop a causal model, which shows how the policy (macro), organizational 
(meso), and project (micro) level stimuli mechanisms interact with the determinants of 
private investment (barriers and drivers) to create an investment response.  This leaves us 
with the task investigating the relative importance of barrier and driver variables in 
stimulating or preventing private investment. Then we would be able to investigate the cost-
effectiveness of various measures in stimulating the drivers and removing the barriers (i.e., 
the cost-effectiveness to mobilize private capital). 
Cost-effectiveness is defined in terms of ‘value’ for money. In our analysis, achieving cost-
effectiveness means maximizing the present value of private investment flows in relation to 
public capital spent to stimulate those flows. It may be worth reflecting upon why private 
investment is chosen as the dependent variable rather than a more traditional public policy 
target such as social optimum, income distribution, or environmental benefits. At first sight it 
 
 
20might appear natural to choose environmental benefits as the dependent variable. For 
example, the GEF defines cost-effectiveness in terms of maximizing the global 
environmental benefits relative to cost.
6
 In the area of climate change, the GEF measures 
how much greenhouse gases were abated relative to the capital spent.  Cost-effective projects 
are those that mitigate a specified amount of greenhouse gas emissions for a given cost.  
If the policy objective is to maximize environmental benefits, then the target should not be 
maximizing environmental benefits but rather private investment – specifically, maximizing 
private investment in clean technologies at a minimum cost to taxpayers. If one wants to 
maximize environmental benefits, why is it necessary to maximize private investment. This 
paradox is explained as follows: first, the sum of private investments in clean technologies is 
presumed to be positively correlated with environmental benefits (the higher private 
investment, the greater environmental benefits). Second, the more private investment, the 
faster will be the process of commercialization of clean technologies. This in turn will 
maximize environmental benefits over time, because if environmental technologies become 
commercial, the amount of private financing will likely dwarf the current environmental 
investments that are mostly publicly funded. Shifting environmental investments to the 
private sector will reduce the dependence on taxpayer support and on scarce public budgets, 
and open environmental markets to the considerable sums of money looking for investment 
opportunities in national and global financial markets.
7
  
5.1 Stricture of the causal model 
The structure of the causal model is illustrated in Figure 5. The causal model links the 
stimulation mechanisms (the independent variables) with the private investment response (the 
                                                 
6 Cost-effectiveness is one of ten operational principles for development and implementation of the GEF’s work 
programme, ‘The GEF will ensure the cost-effectiveness of its activities to maximize global environmental benefits.’ 
(GEF, 1966b) 
7 The assumption is not that investment in clean technologies is the only way to mitigate environmental problems. 
Rather the assumption is that without a significant shift of investment from polluting technologies to clean 
technologies, the world’s environmental problems cannot be solved. 
 
 
21dependent variable) through the determinants of private investment (linking variables in the 
causal pathway). The input variables (stimuli mechanism) are categorized into macro, meso 
and micro. The variables are ordered from those that stimulate the drivers to those that 
overcome the barriers. The linking variables themselves are ordered from drivers to barriers. 
The effect of linking variables range from promotion of investment to prevention. The model 
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Unpredictability:  Private investors are not a homogenous group; they have different goals, 
different perceptions, different decision-making procedures, and they apply different criteria 
for investment. If two investors face identical scenarios (the same barriers and drivers), there 
is no guarantee that they will make the same decision. 
Multiple levels and linkages:  Private Capital Mobilisation (PCM) mechanisms can be 
applied at three levels: the policy level, the organization level, and the project level; and the 
interaction between multiple mechanisms at different levels can make it difficult to trace the 
linkages and identify the significance of each contributing cause. 
Implementation:  The level of PCM may depend not only on the properties of the instruments 
(type, characteristics, scale, etc.), but also on the manner of implementation. 
 
Context:  The level of PCM may also depend on the context/environment within which the 
variables (instruments, barriers, drivers) are embedded. For example, a specific instrument 
may not be effective in mobilizing private capital unless there is a coherent overall policy 
design, organizational design, or project design. 
Endogeneity: There is a possibility that there is a recursive effect between private investment 
and the stimuli that are applied (endogeneity). The causal model suggests that investment 
increases when stimuli increase, but it is equally plausible that stimuli increase when 
investment increases. For example, dialogue between policy-makers and investors may create 
endogenous effects. 
Nonlinearity:  A ‘multivariate regression’ is based on the assumption of (at least 
approximate) linearity: when a variable Y (say, propensity to invest/investment response) 
depends on variables x  …x 1 n, the assumption is that the relation is approximately linear in all 
of the variables. For investment decisions, this is not necessarily the case. Normally, there 
 
 
23will be a large number of conditions, which all have to be satisfied before an investment 
decision can be made. Any one condition, when not fulfilled, can block the decision to invest, 
independently of the values of all other variables. No linear approximation can cover that.
8
5.3 Variables 
The causal model is made up of the dependent variable, the independent variables, and the 
causal pathway that links the two: 
(1) The dependent variable is the investment response, that is, the decision of private 
investors, which can be either ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘partially’, ‘maybe in the future’, or ‘yes, subject to 
condition’. In other words, the decision is to finance, to refrain from financing, to finance it 
partially, to postpone a final decision, or to make the investment decision contingent on the 
fulfillment of certain additional conditions such as changes in the design of policies, 
organizations, and projects. The level of private investment is ideally measured in terms of a 
cost-effectiveness ratio such as the Private Capital Mobilization ratio (PCM ratio). The PCM 
ratio is an indicator that shows how cost-effectively measures (applied on different levels – 
policies, organizations, and projects) have influenced the drivers and barriers to private 
investment, thus stimulating additional private investment. The ratio is calculated by the 
present value (PV) of private capital mobilized, divided by the PV of public expenditure on 
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) 1 (   =   ratio   PCM  
Where  
  =  I amount of private capital in time t  t
 =  D amount of private capital divested in period t  t
                                                 
8 One might say that it could be possible to design some other form of non-linear model, but then the number of 
degrees of freedom in choosing the model's structure is infinite. No method exists to select the ‘right’ model 
structure. A linear model will not work, and there is no way to select a non-linear one. 
 
 
24C  = amount of public expenditure in time t  t
R = amount of public expenditure divested in time t,    t
r = project finance rate (ie the rate of return appropriate for the overall level of risk)
(2)  The independent variables are the stimuli (synonymous with terms like 
measures/actions/mechanisms/instruments)  applied by the government or multilateral 
institutions to influence private investment decisions, or for other reasons that could affect the 
mobilization outcome. The stimuli mechanisms can either be carrots (eg grants) or sticks (eg 
threats to introduce efficiency regulation unless voluntary action is taken). 
(3) The causal pathway is the transmission mechanism linking the stimuli (the independent 
variable) with the investment response (the dependent variable). This transmission 
mechanism consists of the variables that private investors consider before making an 
investment decision. These variables could be called ‘the determinants of private investment’ 
or ‘investment criteria’. They can have two manifestations either as drivers of private 
investment, or as barriers. Whether these variables actually act as drivers or barriers depends 
on the perception of the investor. 
5.4 Outcome 
In the present analysis, achieving cost-effectiveness (in terms of ‘value’ for money) means 
maximizing the present value of private investment flows in relation to the public capital 
spent to stimulate those flows. It may be worth reflecting upon why private investment is 
chosen as the dependent variable (or the primary objective) rather than the more traditional 
public policy targets such as social optimum, income distribution, or environmental benefits. 
At first sight it might appear natural to choose environmental benefits as the dependent 




environmental benefits relative to cost.  In the area of climate change, the GEF measures 
how much greenhouse gases were abated relative to capital spent. For GEF, cost-effective 
projects are those that mitigate a specified amount of greenhouse gas emissions for a given 
cost. These can be identified as projects with low unit abatement cost (UAC), for example, 
the cost per unit of greenhouse gas emissions abated or sequestered (expressed as US dollars 
per ton of carbon equivalent ($/tC))’ [22].
10
If the policy objective is to maximize environmental benefits, then the target should rather be 
with a specific aim to maximize private investment in clean technologies at a minimum cost 
to taxpayers. If one wants to maximize environmental benefits, why is it necessary to 
maximize private investment? This paradox is explained as follows: firstly, the sum of private 
investments in clean technologies is presumed to be positively correlated with environmental 
benefits (the higher the private investment, the greater the environmental benefits). Secondly, 
the more the private investment, the faster will be the process of commercialization of clean 
technologies. This in turn will maximize environmental benefits over time because if 
environmental technologies become commercial, the amount of private financing could dwarf 
the current environmental investments that are mostly publicly funded. Shifting 
environmental investments to the private sector will reduce the dependence on taxpayer 
support and on scarce public budgets, and open environmental markets to the considerable 




                                                 
9 Cost-effectiveness is one of ten operational principles for development and implementation of the GEF’s work 
programme, ‘The GEF will ensure the cost-effectiveness of its activities to maximize global environmental benefits.’ 
(GEF 1996). 
10 Cost-effectiveness is not always the decisive criterion for project selection. 
11 The assumption is not that investment in clean technologies is the only way to mitigate environmental problems. 
Rather the assumption is that without a significant shift of investment from polluting technologies to clean 
technologies, the world’s environmental problems cannot be solved. 
 
 
265.5 Casual Linkages 
A systematic analysis is still valuable and necessary, even if it is not possible to aim for 
general cost-effective rankings among different mechanisms, as well as rankings between the 
most important to the least important barriers and drivers. The value of this analysis lies 
particularly in making explicit how private capital mobilization works as a causal process – 
something that is not necessarily clear, neither to the outside observer, nor to the investor. 
The most important gap in the literature is not the knowledge of policy, institution and project 
designs, nor the knowledge of barriers and drivers, but the systematic understanding of the 
causal processes and the tracing of causal relationships in this subject area. Figure 6 







































































Figure 6.   Causal linkages 
 
The figure depicts the causal pathway – starting from stimulation to initiate or support 
projects Æ Causal factors (barriers/drivers) Æ Investor response (project is financed or not). 
The causal model shows the structure and logic of the model (transmission mechanism). It 
 
 
27indicates that the challenge for any stimuli mechanism is to stimulate the drivers and/or to 
reduce, remove, or overcome the barriers to private investment. The figure also shows that 
the drivers and barriers can have an effect both on the profitability as well as on the 
feasibility of the project: the more barriers exist, and the stronger their cumulative effect, the 
less profitable the project will be, and the more likely that it cannot be implemented. Such 
links with feedback mechanism would help in the identification of corrective measures at 
every step. 
As illustrated in Figure 6 the barriers can be further classified into internal (barriers due to 
flaws in the project or the organization) and external (policy, market, and civil society 
barriers). Internal barriers are easier to overcome, because they require only changes in the 
project or the organizations involved in the project whereas external barriers require policy 
changes, measures to affect the workings of markets, or measures to influence civil society or 
the culture of a country. In designing a complete model, there are numerous variables that 
could potentially be relevant: there are variables in the three categories of project, 
organization, and policy design, and there are variables in the causal pathway (the categories 
of drivers and barriers). 
5.6 Example variables 
To make this abstract model more accessible, Table 1 provides a list of examples of variables 
mentioned in the casual model classified as barriers or drivers based on their properties (e.g., 
high or low). It can be noted that the variables relate to returns, risk or feasibility, or a 
combination of these. However, this list is not comprehensive.  
 
 
28Table 1.  Variables in the causal model (examples) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES x1 
…x
CAUSAL PATHWAY R  DEPENDENT VARIABLE Y 
n
POLICY DESIGN  DRIVERS AND BARRIERS  PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
affects drivers and barriers Æ  to private investment Æ  …thus increasing the PCM ratio 
Legal, tax and regulatory changes  There are types of Private Capital 
Mobilization 
z  Costs relative to project size; e.g., 
z  Electricity tariff reform  — Transaction costs (e.g., initial start-up 
costs, due diligence)  z  Reduction of subsidies to fossil 
fuels 
z  Direct PCM for particular 
projects  — Capital costs relative to market discount 
rates  z  Green tax reform  z  Indirect PCM through 
multiplier effects  z  Legislation enabling independent 
power producers 
— Operating costs 
  — Financing costs 
z  Removing current R & D bias in 
favour of fossil fuels and nuclear 
energy 
The level of private investment, 
ideally measured in terms of a 
cost-effectiveness ratio such as 
the Private Capital Mobilization 
ratio (PCM ratio) 
z  Electricity tariffs 
z  Trade policy (e.g., import duties and 
subsidies) 
z  Policies and programmes 
aimed at speeding up the 
process of investment 
z  Subsidies and taxes on fossil fuels & EE 
(also indirect subsidies such as on transport 
of coal)   
z  System-wide information 
dissemination 
z  Specifications in ownership construction 
and financing model to assure sufficient 
return over the life of the project  PCM ratio  =  
PV of private capital mob
PV of public capital sp
∑
∑ z  International environmental 
agreements  z  Technology performance 
z  Implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol & Flexible Mechanisms 
— Efficiency (including T & D losses) 
  — Simplicity & serviceability 
z  Tradable permits and Clean 
Development Mechanism 
— Reliability 
z  Design and construction risk (e.g., time 
and cost-to-completion)  z  Creation of a system of tradable 
GHG emission permits  z  Market risk (e.g., sales risk and uncertain 
future demand of electricity) 
z  Residual value risk 
z  Technology/obsolescence risk (e.g., 
uncertainties relating to forecasting 
technological innovations) 
z  Policy risk 
z  Fossil fuel price risk 
z  Contract enforcement risk 
z  International climate change 
negotiations, and likelihood of forceful 
government action. 
z  Foreign currency fluctuations (currency 
risk) and extent of local manufacturing 
z  State of infrastructure in a country: (a) 
general infrastructure such as roads, 
telecommunications, and (b) technology 
specific infrastructure such as availability of 
local manufacturers, service institutions. 
z  Procurement policies, e.g., legal 
requirements to do competitive bidding 
based exclusively on lowest cost among all 
power sources vs. EE 
z  Availability of data 
z  Management capacity 
z  Perception of EE technologies 
z  Knowledge by potential customers 
z  Marketing & sales infrastructure 
z  Local maintenance & support services 
z  Bill collection (including ability to speed 
up late payments and pursue payment 
default) 
z  Coordination of national & international 
efforts 
z  Integration of project with utility 
planning processes 
z  Energy planning methodologies (e.g., do 
they reflect the small-scale, modular nature 
of EE)  
z  Political support for the project at two 
 
 
29levels: (a) the policy-making level and (b) 
energy planners, utility managers, and other 
implementing agents 
z  Macroeconomic stability 
z  Income levels of target population 
z  Access to credit & leasing 
z  Investment policy regimes 
z  R & D policy 
z  Private power legislation 
 
Other factors that may influence investment 
decisions: 
z  Whether investor has time and attention 
span 
z  Mood of the investor in moment of 
decision-making 
z  ‘Irrational’ factors (e.g., whether the 
investor likes the members of the project 
team) 
z  ‘Gut’ feelings 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN    
affects drivers and barriers Æ 
Institutional programmes    
z  EE projects implemented by IFC 
z  UN ECE energy efficiency projects 
& technical assistance 
Procedures and incentives 
z  Bonus for developing EE projects 
z  Incentives for hiring experts on EE 
z  Incentives for collaborating with 
other departments and institutions 
PROJECT DESIGN    
affects drivers and barriers Æ 
Financial incentives    
z  Grants 
z  Concessional loans 
z  Guarantees 
z  Equity investments 
Design mechanisms 
z  Clarity of project objectives 
z  Contracts 
z  Planning and risk appraisal 
z  Quality project participants 
z  Technology choice 




6.  STAKEHOLDER ROLE  
There is a growing recognition that the usual investment decisions such as payback period, 
rate of return on investment, net present value, etc, do not account adequately for actual 
consumer behaviour. Technical solutions are not likely to succeed unless there is an interface 
between various actors in the field of EE. In conventional energy programmes, there are only 
two main participants, that is, the suppliers and the consumers. In the EE system, there are 
 
 
30many actors such as the consumer/investors, utilities, government agencies (ministries, state 
agencies, parliamentary commissions, and intergovernmental commissions), financial 
institutions, regulatory bodies, local authorities, research and development organisations, 
equipment manufacturers, market institutions, energy consultants, NGOs, energy service 
companies, the International organizations (e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change),  etc. who play important roles. If the EE programmes are to be widely accepted, all 
these parties should work together. Each actor has relations to other actors. The actor 
experiences constraints and stimuli; has abilities and weaknesses; and holds rights, 
responsibilities and obligations. All these lead to series of decisions. All the actors, and their 
decisions, describe the whole socio-technical structure and the processes that occur. 
While discussing the drivers and barriers, it is important to consider the role of actors such as 
the national government, regional and local authorities, supranational bodies such as 
international development agencies, the United Nations and its specialised bodies, the World 
Bank Group, international and national professional and trade bodies, etc. One could try to 
indicate which ‘actor’ has the power to create/reduce/remove certain barriers and on which 
actors the particular barrier has an influence. One could also try to indicate whether the 
barrier can be modified in the short term (e.g., through a subsidy), in the medium term (e.g., 
through new legislation), or only in the long term (e.g., through improving general 
education), or probably never (e.g., in the case of cultural/religious barriers). One could also 
look at the mechanisms as means to overcome the usual constraints and pave the way for 
smooth functioning of programmes. This, in turn, encourages the removal of barriers and 
positively affects investments. Such an ‘actor-oriented’ approach would give clearer insights 
into barrier analysis.  Through such an approach we can find out the role of actors. For 
example, if any barrier is named, we can see who created it, and who, therefore, is (in 
 
 
31principle) able to remove it.  Figure 7 illustrates actors in the field of EE in general, from 




  (a) Governments and national energy agencies
  (c) Bilateral donor aid agencies
(d) Regulatory commissions
(e) Energy Efficiency and conservation centers
(f) Multilateral development banks 
 
 













Figure 7: Actors’ Perspectives 
 
At the micro level: To design better programmes, they are the persons/consumers to address 
(information, training, support by specialists, etc). 
At the meso level: Organisations such as utilities, energy development agencies, service 
companies, etc. Through new incentives, organizational reform, and other changes, barriers 
can be reduced or removed. 
At the macro level: Relate to the ‘higher-level’ institutions (state/market/civil society) that 
determine the setting under which the lower levels have to operate. 
The actions needed to address barriers are different for each. Through this approach, we not 
only need to look at the barriers themselves, but also at the institutions/situations that create 
the barriers. Each actor would then have two roles: (i) to carry out a project at his own level, 
the actor has to work within existing ‘external constraints’ given by ‘higher-level’ 
institutions, and (ii) establish conditions (either barriers or drivers) for other actors at a ‘lower 
(a) utilities
 (b) energy development agencies 
 © Energy service companies  Actors in the 
filed of EE  (b) Financial institutions and banks 
(c) Equipment manufacturers 
Meso level
(a) Energy-end users 
 (b) Non-governmental Organizations 
  Micro level
 
 
32level’. This approach can be used in surveys, by asking every actor to describe the types of 
barriers affecting profitability and feasibility as he perceives them. 
Each actor in the field of EE has a specific function, but even without being an active 
performer, everybody can be positively influenced by EE thanks to its character of positive 
externality. Everybody has a responsibility: governments, industries, business associations, 
donors, and international institutions; they all should recognize their respective roles. The EE 
process can be completed only by cooperation, by a common achievement. If the government 
wants to promote EE, it needs to see how the whole system can be modified which can lead 
to more EE-directed decisions. Table 2 demonstrates main functions of the actors in the field 
of EE. Each of them has a specific role(s) in the process of the implementation of EE. They 
are mutually connected: 
 
7. BARRIER TREATMENT 
It is important to explore the relationship between the independent variables (the stimuli 
mechanisms) and the linking variables (the drivers and barriers).  This relationship can be 
described as a process of stimulating the drivers and overcoming the barriers to private 
investment. Overcoming the barriers would reduce the overall financing need for energy 
efficiency and promote sustainable development. It is important to recognize that the process 
of 'overcoming' barriers is not a single process, but, in fact, three separate processes. 
 
 
33Table 2:  Functions of the stakeholders in energy efficiency systems 
 
Level  Actors  Functions 





 Publicise good examples; 
 Network to make use of the latest experiences in research both in  
technology and applications. 
 Provide a whole range of lighting devices to the consumers; 
Equipment 
manufacturers
 Cooperate on developing and later promoting EE technologies;  Meso   Make consumers understand they should not consider only 
purchasing but life-cycle costs. 
 Disseminate the achieved results;  Business and 
industry 
enterprises 
 Appeal to members to apply EE;     Negotiate with involved partners in terms of achieving EE 
targets, eg with government, foreign organizations, etc. 
 Help to finance EE programmes; 
Financial 
Institutions 
 Disseminate information about EETs;     Cooperate with other agencies to implement common 
programmes; 
 Improve energy services – supply, transmission and distribution;  Energy 
Supply 
agencies  
 Propagate EE technologies;      Provide incentives to those who use EETs and disincentives to 
those who do not . 
 Establish legal and institutional frameworks; 
Macro Governments   Integrate EE in decision-making in all sectors,  
 Support administrative efforts to enhance EE; 
 EE  agencies 
 Collect and propagate information about activities, experiences, 
programs and projects; 
 Develop and implement EE programmes; 
 Put programmes together to ensure a larger market response. 
 Develop supporting instruments for monitoring and evaluation; 
  International 
organizations 
 Support mutual interest by adapting routines and instruments; 
 Serve as a forum to disseminate results; 
 Act as a clearing-house to establish collaborative actions. 
Source:  based on OECD, 1999 
 
 
Type 1:  Removing a barrier (or risk) means getting rid of a barrier altogether, so that all 
present and future projects no longer face that barrier. For example, if a government repeals a 
law that obstructs energy efficiency, the change of legislation will affect all present and 
future projects. Unless the law is reintroduced later, the barrier is removed altogether. In 
terms of policy objectives, this is the most desirable form of overcoming barriers. 
 
 
34Type 2:  Reducing a barrier (or risk) means that the barrier remains in place, but that its 
deterrent effect is diminished. For example, if a government increases electricity tariffs but 
not sufficiently to cover long-run marginal costs, the barrier of distorted electricity pricing is 
reduced but not removed. 
Type 3:  Avoiding a barrier (or risk) means that the barrier can be overcome or avoided 
during a  particular programme, while remaining in place for others. 
While Type 1 and Type 2 are actions addressed primarily to the actor who has created the 
barrier, Type 3, is addressed primarily to the actor who wants to ‘work around’ the barrier (a 
different person/institution). 
Of all the approaches to overcome barriers, removing obstacles (Type 1) may be the most 
expensive and difficult. Yet, it is probably the most cost-effective, because in this way, 
barriers disappear for all projects in an economy – present as well as future. In practice, 
however, the most common approach seems to be the least effective, namely, the avoiding of 
barriers (Type 3). It seems that many agencies promoting energy efficiency merely ‘lift’ 
projects over the same hurdles time and again. From a public policy perspective, this is not a 
desirable approach, as it represents a waste of public funds.  
A case in point is the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The Operational Strategy of GEF 
states that the removal of barriers to energy efficiency and renewable energy are central to the 
mission of the organization (GEF 1996). The GEF supports projects (and ‘programmes’) that 
tackle institutional and structural shortcomings, and in this way modify the barriers and 
drivers. Two of the ten operational programmes at GEF are specifically aimed at removing 
barriers to energy efficiency (Operational Programme #5
12
) and renewable energy 
                                                 
12 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) seeks to stabilize atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentrations at levels that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with global 
climate. The Operational Strategy of the GEF puts initial emphasis, among others, on the removal of barriers to 




35(Operational Programme #6) [22]. However, the incremental cost principle, based on which 
GEF distributes its funds, contradicts this objective because it usually results merely in 
‘lifting’ the projects over barriers, rather than reducing or removing the barriers that create 
the incremental cost problem in the first place. As a result, the barriers remain in place, 
‘waiting’ to obstruct the next project. 
To illustrate this important point, consider an energy efficiency lighting programme, which 
addresses two main barriers: high initial cost of efficient light bulbs and lack of consumer 
awareness. Given enough financial resources and successful project implementation, both 
barriers can be overcome. This, however, does not guarantee that those barriers will 
permanently disappear. It may happen that the consumers, who got used to highly subsidized 
prices, make it difficult for the manufacturer to sell the bulbs at commercial prices once the 
project is over. This is because the consumers tend to forget the benefits of efficient light 
bulbs after a while, or because they are simply unwilling to accept increased prices. In order 
to prevent this, incentives must be given to the project developers to ensure the durability of 
the barrier removal measures so that the impact stretches beyond the individual programme. 
The sustainability of barrier removal should be one of the main criteria by which 
development agencies allocate funding to programmes. This should be made mandatory in all 
the business plans submitted as part of applications for energy efficiency funding. 
While barrier removal (Type 1) is quite rare, many projects achieve barrier reduction (Type 
2). It can be hypothesized that all successful energy efficiency projects contribute to the 
reduction of costs or other barriers, thus accelerating the process of commercialisation. Types 
1 and 2 refer to possible actions by an authority, which is responsible for the barrier/driver, or 
has the power to modify it. The primary target for barrier removal and reduction should be 
the government, but other institutions may also be able to influence the process in direct and 




36indirect ways. For example, rather than lobbying a reluctant government, it may in some 
cases be more effective to work with private sector or civil society organizations, if they have 
an influence reducing or removing barriers. 
Type 3 refers to the ways in which the implementing agency and the programme manager can 
‘get round’ the problem. Although this is usually the least cost option in the short term, 
avoiding a barrier is a short cut that should not be taken, as it does not improve the process of 
commercializing energy efficiency. Programme developers and financiers are likely to 
choose the cheapest and easiest method of overcoming the barriers – which is usually to 
avoid them, leaving the task of reducing and removing barriers for other agencies. However, 
even for private programme developers and financiers, this makes only short-term sense, as 
they would themselves benefit from barrier removal in the long term.  
In the light of this analysis, one can arrive at two approaches to overcome the barriers to 
private investment. The first one has the primary objective of removing, or at least reducing 
barriers, which can be referred to as a targeted barrier removal effort. The second approach 
has the primary objective of maximizing the project’s profit. Examples for targeted barrier 
removal efforts include: 
Policy initiatives to remove direct and indirect subsidies for fossil fuels; Initiatives to provide 
energy efficiency information (e.g., through mass media, Internet) to create awareness; 
Initiatives to train programme developers, financiers and government officials, and to provide 
them with the means and incentives to change the structure of barriers and drivers. 
If successfully implemented, these activities are likely to yield high economic and 
environmental benefits per unit of consumer expenditure on energy. 
8.  ANALYSIS OF DRIVERS- SPECIFIC EXAMPLES 
Along with the barriers one should understand the motivation and forces that lead consumers 
to adopt energy-efficient measures. Information directed towards understanding consumer’s 
 
 
37decision-making behaviour and preferences as well as the behaviour of other stakeholders 
would give a better understanding of the drivers that push energy efficiency measures. The 
models and analysis presented above for barriers could be extended for the study of Drivers. 
Here, we discuss specific examples.  
Awareness:  It is clear from the above discussion that there are a wide variety of players that 
can contribute to barrier removal measures, who can also stimulate the drivers and thereby 
help the penetration of energy efficient technologies. A case in point is the strong competition 
between technology manufacturers that results in aggressive advertising campaigns. The 
advertising campaign in this example is the measure (stimulant), and the high level of 
awareness of energy efficient technologies, thus created, is the driver. 
Decrease in technology price levels:  A high level of awareness is usually not sufficient to 
attract private investment and guarantee market success. The general understanding of market 
mechanisms dictates that price of a technology is an important factor in its speedy 
penetration. Hence, one can assume that educational/promotional activities are important, 
even though, there should be other considerations as well. Along with advertisement 
campaigns, the competition should lead to a decrease in the cost of the technology.  Such 
reductions in prices can safely be assumed to lead to an increase in the sales of the 
technology. 
Increase in energy prices:  Cost savings in energy bills through reduced use of energy is one 
of the reasons for the decision to buy energy efficient equipment. A look at the electricity 
prices in developing countries over the past few years indicates that nominal electricity prices 
increased manifold during the 1990s. In real terms, the price increase may be less but is still 
significant to affect purchasing and investment decisions. Increased energy prices place a 
higher burden on consumers. If there is a continuous and predictable increase in its price, 
 
 
38consumers are more likely to be motivated to adopt energy efficient equipment to conserve 
electricity and heat. 
Technology appeal:  While analysing drivers, one factor that may be of worth considering is 
the ‘smartness’ of the technology. If the energy-efficient equipment gives an impression that 
it looks ‘modern’, ‘appealing’, and ‘fashionable’, there is a higher probability of consumers 
purchasing the technology. These non-economic motivations, in general, dominate the 
decisions primarily of high-income groups, for whom, technological appeal is a major driving 
factor. 
Non-energy benefits:  Non-energy benefits are important drivers of energy efficiency. They 
accrue  at the national level, e.g. via improved competitiveness, energy security, job creation, 
From a consumer perspective, it is often the non-energy benefits that motivate decisions to 
adopt energy efficient measures. The benefits to the consumer through these measures 
include (i) improved indoor environment, comfort, health, safety, and productivity; (ii) 
reduced noise; (iii) labour and time savings; (iv) improved process control; (v) increased 
reliability, amenity or convenience; and (vi) direct and indirect economic benefits from 
downsizing or elimination of equipment.  
Environmental Regulations:  Environmental regulations, if properly designed, can serve as a 
driver for investments in energy efficiency.  In the absence of environmental regulations, the 
societal costs of electricity generation in the form of air emissions, water use and other 
environmental impacts are not borne by the energy producer or by the consumer.   
Consequently, these actors do not see the true societal costs of their production and 
consumption decisions.  Environmental regulations can force producers and consumers to 
internalize these environmental costs into the price of their energy goods and services in the 
form of increased environmental compliance costs.  These increased environmental costs can 
send a price signal for increased investments in energy efficiency by making efficiency 
 
 
39investments comparatively more attractive financially.  Not all environmental regulations are 
created equally, however.  If an environmental regulation simply mandates that an industry 
install a particular pollution control device, then the industry’s response will be to seek ways 
to minimize its cost of compliance with the pollution control requirement and the price signal 
for efficiency investments will be muted.  Once the pollution control device is installed, there 
will be little incentive to improve the efficiency of the overall production process.  If, on the 
other hand, the environmental regulation uses market mechanisms to reward industry for 
reducing emissions through, for example, tradable permits, then the industry would have the 
incentive to improve the efficiency of and continuously improve its manufacturing process 
and potentially turn the environmental regulations into a source of profitability.  A more 
efficient manufacturing process would naturally follow.     
9.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper attempts to study the barriers and drivers that influence investments in energy 
efficiency using an actor-oriented approach. It starts with the development of a new 
taxonomy of barriers/drivers classifying them in terms of profitability and feasibility of 
private investments in energy efficiency.  The barriers are classified into three broad 
categories, viz., micro, meso and macro. In practice, these barriers are of the following types: 
perceptual-behavioural, financial-economic, institutional-structural and market oriented. Such 
classification is expected to help devise the response measures to remove, reduce, or avoid 
the barriers. The paper is also aimed at understanding which drivers contribute to the 
successful diffusion of energy efficiency measures. This would facilitate development of 
appropriate support mechanisms at financial, policy, institutional, regulation, and information 
levels. 
Further, using this taxonomy, the paper develops a theoretical framework which proposes a 
methodology to analyze the causal relationship between barriers/drivers and the appropriate 
 
 
40response measures. This work brings out clearly the need for a different set of response 
measures, depending on which group a barrier belongs to. At the policy level, some barriers 
can hardly be influenced by an energy efficiency project team, and whoever encounters them 
has to accept them. But if the ‘project’ is of a wider scope, let us say, a programme of  
institutional development financed by international donors, that programme may be able to 
modify some of the barriers. Hence, it is important to try to assess which barriers are more or 
less ‘unchangeable’, and which may be worth tackling by such programmes. This would 
greatly help both the multilateral and government agencies in devising their strategies in 
terms of support to future barrier removal programs. This analysis has profound implications 
for barrier taxonomy, which, in turn, helps design energy efficiency projects. The paper 
underlines the significance of the identification and classification of real barriers, which is a 
precondition for the successful diffusion of energy efficient technologies. 
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